Himmelfarb Health Sciences Library, The George Washington University

Health Sciences Research Commons
Center for Health Policy Research

Health Policy and Management

5-2002

The Medicaid Buy-In Program: Lessons Learned
from Nine "Early Implementer" States
Donna Folkemer
National Conference of State Legislatures

Allen Jensen
George Washington University

Robert Silverstein
Center for the Study and Advancement of Disability Policy

Tara Straw
National Conference of State Legislatures

Follow this and additional works at: http://hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.edu/sphhs_policy_chpr
Part of the Health and Medical Administration Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons,
and the Health Policy Commons
Recommended Citation
Folkemer, Donna; Jensen, Allen; Silverstein, Robert; and Straw, Tara, "The Medicaid Buy-In Program: Lessons Learned from Nine
"Early Implementer" States" (2002). Center for Health Policy Research. Paper 12.
http://hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.edu/sphhs_policy_chpr/12

This Report is brought to you for free and open access by the Health Policy and Management at Health Sciences Research Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Center for Health Policy Research by an authorized administrator of Health Sciences Research Commons. For more
information, please contact hsrc@gwu.edu.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation
Office of Disability, Aging and Long-Term Care Policy

THE MEDICAID
BUY-IN PROGRAM:
LESSONS LEARNED FROM
NINE “EARLY IMPLEMENTER” STATES

May 2002

Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation
The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE) is the
principal advisor to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) on policy development issues, and is responsible for major activities in the areas
of legislative and budget development, strategic planning, policy research and
evaluation, and economic analysis.
ASPE develops or reviews issues from the viewpoint of the Secretary, providing a
perspective that is broader in scope than the specific focus of the various operating
agencies. ASPE also works closely with the HHS operating divisions. It assists these
agencies in developing policies, and planning policy research, evaluation and data
collection within broad HHS and administration initiatives. ASPE often serves a
coordinating role for crosscutting policy and administrative activities.
ASPE plans and conducts evaluations and research--both in-house and through support
of projects by external researchers--of current and proposed programs and topics of
particular interest to the Secretary, the Administration and the Congress.

Office of Disability, Aging and Long-Term Care Policy
The Office of Disability, Aging and Long-Term Care Policy (DALTCP), within ASPE, is
responsible for the development, coordination, analysis, research and evaluation of
HHS policies and programs which support the independence, health and long-term care
of persons with disabilities--children, working aging adults, and older persons. DALTCP
is also responsible for policy coordination and research to promote the economic and
social well-being of the elderly.
In particular, DALTCP addresses policies concerning: nursing home and communitybased services, informal caregiving, the integration of acute and long-term care,
Medicare post-acute services and home care, managed care for people with disabilities,
long-term rehabilitation services, children’s disability, and linkages between employment
and health policies. These activities are carried out through policy planning, policy and
program analysis, regulatory reviews, formulation of legislative proposals, policy
research, evaluation and data planning.
This report was prepared under contract #HHS-100-00-0018 between HHS’s
ASPE/DALTCP and George Washington University. For additional information about
this subject, you can visit the DALTCP home page at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/_/office_specific/daltcp.cfm or contact the office at
HHS/ASPE/DALTCP, Room 424E, H.H. Humphrey Building, 200 Independence
Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20201. The e-mail address is:
webmaster.DALTCP@hhs.gov. The Project Officer was Andreas Frank.

THE MEDICAID BUY-IN PROGRAM:
Lessons Learned From
Nine “Early Implementer” States

Donna Folkemer
National Conference of State Legislatures
Allen Jensen
Center for Health Services Research and Policy
School of Public Health and Health Services
George Washington Medical Center
Robert Silverstein
Center for the Study and Advancement of Disability Policy
Tara Straw
National Conference of State Legislatures

May 2002

Prepared for
Office of Disability, Aging and Long-Term Care Policy
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Contract #HHS-100-00-0018
This policy paper was funded through a contract with the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation supporting a project entitled “Case
Studies and Technical Assistance for Medicaid Buy-Ins for People with Disabilities.” This paper was also
funded by a grant from the National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research of the U.S.
Department of Education supporting the Rehabilitation Research and Training Center on Workforce
Investment and Employment Policy for Persons with Disabilities. In addition, this paper was supported by
a grant from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.
The opinions Contained in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Department of Education, or the Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................ iii
I.

INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................... 1

II.

POLICY APPROACHES AND ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE ......................... 3
A. Consumer Roles ............................................................................................. 3
B. The Role of State Legislatures ........................................................................ 4
C. Management Structures .................................................................................. 5

III.

MEDICAID BUY-IN PROGRAM DESIGN FEATURES........................................... 7
A. General Eligibility ............................................................................................ 7
B. Income Eligibility ............................................................................................. 7
C. Resource Limitations....................................................................................... 9
D. Cost-Sharing Policies .................................................................................... 11
E. Protections and Assurances.......................................................................... 13
F. Design Changes............................................................................................ 15

IV.

COST ESTIMATES AND BUDGET MODELS...................................................... 16

V.

PROGRAM EXPERIENCE AND OUTCOMES ..................................................... 18
A. Data Sources ................................................................................................ 18
B. Program Experience ..................................................................................... 18

VI.

EFFECT OF THE MEDICAID BUY-IN ON ACCESS TO COVERAGE................. 21
A. Variation in Access to Medicaid .................................................................... 21
B. Access to SSI Work Incentives ..................................................................... 22
C. Federal Barriers Affecting State Initiatives .................................................... 23

VII. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 25

i

LIST OF TABLES
TABLE 1. Medicaid Buy-In Program Income Eligibility Criteria ..................................... 8
TABLE 2. Medicaid Buy-In Program: Resources Limits and Exclusions..................... 10
TABLE 3. Cost-Sharing Policies: Minimum Income Level and Premium
Method ....................................................................................................... 13
TABLE 4. Work-Related Policies and Protections ...................................................... 14
TABLE 5. Monthly Unearned Income of Medicaid Buy-In Enrollees ........................... 20
TABLE 6. Medicaid “Starting Points” .......................................................................... 22
TABLE 7. Administration of Medicaid Eligibility Criteria and State SSI
Supplementation......................................................................................... 23

ii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
For many individual Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) recipients, the risk of losing Medicaid coverage linked to their
cash benefits is a powerful work disincentive. Eliminating barriers to health care and
creating incentives to work can greatly improve financial independence and well being.
To support this goal, Congress included a Medicaid Buy-In option in the Balanced
Budget Act of 1997 and enacted the Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement
Act (TWWIIA) in 1999. These laws authorized states to create Medicaid Buy-In
programs to extend Medicaid coverage to persons with disabilities who go to work.
This report discusses findings from case studies of nine states operating Medicaid
Buy-In programs for working persons with disabilities. The nine states are Alaska,
Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, Vermont, and
Wisconsin. At the time of the study, approximately 13,000 persons were enrolled in the
programs in the nine states. The paper gives particular attention to the decisions made
by states concerning program eligibility, their approaches to estimating program
enrollment and costs, and the patterns of program enrollment to date. The report is
designed to assist stakeholders (such as Medicaid directors, state legislators, and
cross-disability coalitions) design and implement Medicaid Buy-In programs and related
work incentive initiatives.
This report is the second in a series of three reports. The first report includes indepth case studies of nine early implementer states entitled Medicaid Buy-In Programs:
Case Studies of Early Implementer States. The final report, Policy Frameworks for
Designing Medicaid Buy-In Programs and Related State Work Incentive Initiatives,
provides policy frameworks describing the interrelationships between health
entitlements (especially Medicaid) and cash assistance programs (particularly SSDI,
SSI and state SSI supplementation programs). 1

Major Findings
1.

Medicaid Buy-In programs typically are managed by state Medicaid
agencies with significant input from consumers and assistance from other
state agencies.
•

Stakeholder involvement was important in program design. The input of
persons with disabilities and other stakeholders had an impact in shaping

1

The three reports were funded through a contract with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office
of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation supporting a project entitled "Case Studies and Technical
Assistance for Medicaid Buy-Ins for People with Disabilities." Additional support was provided from a grant from
the National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research of the U.S. Department of Education supporting the
Rehabilitation Research and Training Center on Workforce Investment and Employment Policy for Persons with
Disabilities and a grant from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.
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program design. In many states, persons with disabilities played a central
role in planning the program and were heavily involved in surveys, field
research, focus groups or other preliminary program design activities.
Several states have formal mechanisms for involving persons with
disabilities in program management.

2.

•

The Medicaid Buy-In program is linked to other employment supports.
To address the multiple barriers facing persons with significant disabilities,
most states linked their Medicaid Buy-In program to complementary
employment supports for persons with disabilities. Benefits counseling,
expanded vocational rehabilitation services, supports for employers, and
collaboration with One-Stop centers are among the programs in place.

•

The state Medicaid agency usually works with other state agencies to
support persons with disabilities in the workplace. In general, states
use existing Medicaid eligibility, reimbursement, service delivery and
program management structures, both at the state and county level, to
administer the Medicaid Buy-In program. In most states, the Medicaid
agency has formal or informal relationship with other state agencies,
particularly vocational rehabilitation programs, to carry out functions that are
outside the scope of Medicaid.

Eligibility standards and cost-sharing policies show considerable variation
across the states and may have a significant impact on program
enrollment.
•

Most Medicaid Buy-In programs have an upper income limit of 250% of
Federal Poverty Level (FPL) and broadened asset standards, but vary
considerably in how they "count" income and assets. With the
exception of Connecticut and Minnesota, the upper income limit for
Medicaid Buy-In programs is 250% of FPL ($1,790 monthly net income after
applying the standard SSI disregards or $3,665 gross income for a single
person in 2001). Connecticut's limit is 450% of poverty while Minnesota
has no upper income limit. CoMost Medicaid Buy-In programs have an
upper income limit of 250% of Federal Poverty Level (FPL) and broadened
asset standards, but vary considerably in how they "count" income and
assets. With the exception of Connecticut and Minnesota, and Oregon do
not count the income of other household members, thus easing access to
the program for certain married individuals. In every state except Alaska
and Nebraska, applicants may retain more assets than persons in other
Medicaid categories. In several states, retirement accounts, medical savings
accounts, or approved employment accounts are not counted as assets and
provide additional opportunities for individuals to save money.

•

Limits on unearned income may be an important factor in restraining
enrollment in several states. In the states of Alaska, Maine, Nebraska,

iv

and Vermont, in addition to gross income standards, applicants are subject
to a separate dollar limit on their unearned income. This policy prevents
enrollment of persons with significant income from non-work sources and
may have the effect of reducing overall program enrollment.

3.

•

Persons with incomes above specified levels must pay premiums. The
threshold level for premium liability ranges from 100% FPL to 200% FPL.
Four states--Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, and Vermont--use a premium
schedule based on income brackets. In three others--Alaska, Connecticut,
and Minnesota--applicants pay a premium calculated as a variable
percentage of individual or household income. The states of Oregon and
Wisconsin calculate premiums separately for earned and unearned income
with steeper schedules for unearned income. This approach may
discourage persons with substantial income from non-work sources from
enrolling in the program.

•

Several states provide enrollment protections for individuals who lose
employment while in the Medicaid Buy-In program, but protections are
not consistent across the states. Such protections are designed to
continue Medicaid eligibility for persons when they temporarily lose their ties
to the workplace. Connecticut, Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin provide
an incentive for continued work effort by providing Medicaid Buy-In program
coverage during temporary periods of unemployment and, in Wisconsin,
before an individual finds a job as well. Without such protections, individuals
risk losing Medicaid benefits if a job effort fails. Allowing persons returning
to other Medicaid categories to retain accumulated assets is an additional
protection available in Connecticut and Minnesota.

Available data are insufficient to show whether the program is meeting its
objectives.
•

Before they began operating their Medicaid Buy-In programs, states
developed enrollment and cost projections, often assuming
considerable contributions from private insurance and premium
payments. States typically used existing Medicaid eligibility and claims data
to estimate program enrollment and per capita costs. States typically relied
on the estimates of other states when projecting private insurance offsets
and premium payment amounts. Thus far, premium payments and private
insurance offsets have been lower than expected, due in part to lower than
expected levels of earned income and insufficient work hours to qualify for
private insurance coverage. States with large state-funded personal care or
pharmacy programs, such as Connecticut and Wisconsin, are offsetting
some previous state expenditures with federal Medicaid funds.

•

Program performance data are not available in a consistent format
across the states. The amount and types of administrative program data
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available from the states varies considerably. While every state can report
the number of participants, the availability of data on earnings, private
insurance coverage, or client characteristics is not uniformly available. Thus,
it is not possible to compare state experience across a broad range of
variables.

4.

•

Preliminary data show actual enrollment exceeding projections in two
states, falling short of projections in one state, and matching
projections in five states. Minnesota and Iowa have exceeded
projections, Nebraska has fallen short of projections, and Alaska,
Connecticut, Maine, Vermont, and Wisconsin have matched projections.
(Oregon did not provide information on projected enrollment.) Given the
variation in state methods of projecting enrollment, it is not possible to
identify with certainty the forecasting approaches that are most likely to
result in accurate estimates.

•

Most Medicaid Buy-In program enrollees are persons who moved from
another Medicaid eligibility category to the Medicaid Buy-In program.
Consistent with state expectations, most Medicaid Buy-In program enrollees
are individuals who were already enrolled in Medicaid and who moved from
another category to the Medicaid Buy-In category. Such persons include
both individuals who moved from a "spend-down" category to the Medicaid
Buy-In program and persons who moved from another category when their
incomes increased.

State policies on general Medicaid eligibility, SSI, and state SSI
supplementation and federal policies on SSDI affect Medicaid access for
working persons with disabilities.
•

A state's choices about SSI and state SSI supplementation affect
Medicaid access for working persons with disabilities. When states
elect to provide automatic Medicaid eligibility for all SSI beneficiaries, SSI
beneficiaries who go to work receive Medicaid coverage automatically
through Section 1619 work incentives without submitting any additional
documentation. Four study states--Iowa, Maine, Vermont, and Wisconsin
--have automatic eligibility for federal SSI recipients. Five study states-Alaska, Connecticut, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Oregon--make retaining
coverage somewhat more difficult by requiring a separate application to the
state for continued Medicaid coverage. Similarly, states can adopt policies
that help assure continued Medicaid coverage when persons eligible only
for state SSI supplements without federal SSI enter the work force.
Connecticut, Vermont, and Wisconsin have adopted such policies.

•

A state's choices about income standards for persons with disabilities
within its overall Medicaid program affect Medicaid access for working
persons with disabilities. In a state with relatively generous Medicaid
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income standards in non-Buy-In categories, a greater proportion of working
persons with disabilities can gain access to Medicaid through avenues other
than a Medicaid Buy-In program. Income standards in traditional Medicaid
eligibility categories vary greatly across the study states with Alaska,
Connecticut, Maine, Nebraska, and Vermont having higher income
standards than the other states.
•

Several states cite the Social Security Administration's (SSA) inability
to grant demonstration waivers for SSDI beneficiaries as a barrier to
increasing program enrollment and the earnings levels of participants.
Preliminary data suggest that significant numbers of persons participating in
Medicaid Buy-In programs may increase their disposable incomes but are
unwilling to earn more than $780 per month (Substantial Gainful ActivitySGA) because their eligibility for SSDI will be jeopardized by doing so. (In
states collecting earnings data, only 14% of enrollees in Medicaid Buy-In
programs had earnings over SGA.) States want to implement projects that
would move from the "cash cliff" to a gradual phase-out of benefits, but have
not received authority to do so.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For individuals with disabilities receiving Medicaid, the fear of losing health care
and related services is one of the barriers keeping such individuals from maximizing
their employment, earnings potential, and independence. Too often persons with
significant disabilities can not obtain private sector health insurance that provides
coverage of the services and supports that enable them to live independently and enter,
remain in, or rejoin the workforce. Thus, they need to rely on Medicaid for coverage of
such necessary services as personal assistance, prescription drugs, and durable
medical equipment.
Eliminating barriers to health care and other needed supports and creating
financial incentives to work can greatly improve short and long-term financial
independence and financial well being. So concluded Congress when it included a
Medicaid Buy-In option in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and when it enacted the
TWWIIA. By authorizing states to offer Medicaid Buy-In programs, these pieces of
legislation opened a window of opportunity for states to develop work incentive
initiatives that encourage people with disabilities to work or increase their level of work.
To date, 19 states 2 have implemented Medicaid Buy-In programs for working
persons with disabilities, several additional states have enacted legislation aimed at
creating such programs, 3 and one state (Massachusetts) created a similar program
under Section 1115 Demonstration Project authority. As states consider new policy
initiatives, they need information from other states as to what has worked, what has not
worked, and why. They need guidance on such issues as:
•

Who needs the services and supports?

•

How many people are likely to enroll?

•

How much will it cost?

•

What program design options are available?

•

What kind of infrastructure maximizes effective and efficient implementation?

2

Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.
3
States enacting legislation include Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, New York,
Texas, and West Virginia. The legislation is diverse and in some states is directed toward the creation of
demonstration projects.
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•

What are the best strategies for involving persons with disabilities in the decisionmaking processes?

•

What standards are appropriate for measuring outcomes?

To assist states as they seek answers to these questions, the Assistant Secretary
for Planning and Evaluation, in coordination with the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, asked the Project Team to provide information on state experiences with the
design and implementation of Medicaid Buy-In programs for workers with disabilities.
The overall project had several purposes.
•

To examine and describe the early implementation experiences of nine states
that opted for the Medicaid Buy-In program for working disabled persons.

•

To use the descriptive information to inform and provide technical assistance to
various state-level stakeholders about the lessons that can be learned from these
states.

•

To inform federal policymakers so that they can better understand the
experiences of states implementing Medicaid Buy-In programs.
To accomplish the project purposes, the Project Team prepared:

•

Case studies of each of nine states.

•

A summary of the lessons learned from the nine state Case Study.

•

A policy guide for developing health care and income assistance components of
a state's comprehensive work incentive initiative for disabled workers.

•

A summary of conclusions and recommendations for use by federal agencies to
enhance employment and earnings for persons with significant disabilities.

The Case Study states are Alaska, Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Oregon, Vermont, and Wisconsin. These nine states, with approximately
13,000 enrollees at the time of the study, are geographically dispersed and illustrate a
variety of program design options and decision-making strategies.
This paper describes the lessons learned from the nine state case studies. The
paper examines information gathering strategies, Medicaid Buy-In program design
features, policy approaches and administrative systems, cost estimation methodologies,
and program experience. Eligibility standards for calendar year 2001 are used in the
report.
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II. POLICY APPROACHES AND
ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE
In each state, the specific roles played by stakeholder groups, such as state
officials, consumers, advocates, providers and employers, in the design and
implementation of the Medicaid Buy-In program vary. In general, states use existing
state Medicaid administrative structures to manage their Medicaid Buy-In programs, but
each state charted its own path in creating a program that met the needs of that specific
state.
In order to design their work incentives programs to meet the specific needs of
their residents, states conducted surveys, held focus groups, carried out field research,
and engaged in informal data gathering. They used these findings to refine their
Medicaid Buy-In programs and to identify additional employment initiatives appropriate
to support workers with disabilities.
In all of the states, consumers with disabilities and their advocates, working with
other stakeholders, play a central role in shaping the design of the Medicaid Buy-In
program and related employment initiatives. Several states established formal
mechanisms for involving consumers with disabilities and disability organizations. Other
states provide less formal approaches for securing consumer input.

A. Consumer Roles
In most Case Study states, consumers participated in program design through
cross-disability coalitions. For example, in Minnesota, the Minnesota Work Incentives
Coalition and the Minnesota Consortium of Citizens with Disabilities played critical roles
by conducting and publishing a survey on work incentives in the state. In Connecticut,
a coalition established in 1999 consisting of disability groups, consumers, and
advocates was a major force. Several consumer-focused groups continue to provide
advice on the Medicaid Buy-In program, including the state Committee for Persons with
Disabilities.
In several states, a broad-based working group provided leadership for the
creation of the Medicaid Buy-In program. In Oregon, for example, the state created a
steering committee of advocates, consumers, researchers and state officials to design
the original Medicaid Buy-In program. In Maine, the original Medicaid Buy-In Advisory
Council included consumers, advocacy groups and service providers. This group was
expanded and renamed CHOICES Advisory Group as part of the state's systems
change work under the Medicaid Infrastructure grant.
Wisconsin contracted with Employment Resources, Inc. and the University of
Wisconsin to research work incentives. The project's Consumer Advisory Panel
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included individuals with disabilities who had personal experience with the long-term
support system and had faced barriers to getting and keeping work. In addition to
surveys, the state asked a community rehabilitation provider to test innovative
approaches to person-centered approaches, including Vocational Futures Planning.
In Alaska, cross-disability groups, including the State Independent Living Council,
the Governor's Committee on Employment and Rehabilitation of Persons with
Disabilities, the Alaska Human Resources Investment Council and the Alaska Mental
Health Trust Authority were involved in the initial planning of the Medicaid Buy-In
program. The Governor of Alaska convened a Disability Summit where the high
unemployment rate of persons with severe disabilities was discussed. In conjunction
with consumer groups, Alaska conducted a survey and did field research to examine
the efficacy of providing comprehensive vocational rehabilitation services and benefits
counseling.
In Iowa, an association of employers played a major role. The Iowa Business
Council, consisting of the 25 largest businesses in the state, identified persons with
disabilities as an untapped pool of potential employees. The Council worked with
Creative Employment Options, the employment policy arm of a university-affiliated
program, to create a Medicaid Buy-In Program to foster economic development in the
state.
States often use more informal approaches to gather information, including
meetings with stakeholders and legislative and executive branch planning sessions. In
Nebraska, the state convened a stakeholder group during the development of the
Medicaid Buy-In program. In Vermont, several focus groups identified barriers faced by
persons with disabilities and the need for benefits counseling. In Iowa, consumer
groups are providing advice on an informal basis through the Personal Assistance and
Comprehensive Family Support Services Council.

B. The Role of State Legislatures
State laws authorizing Medicaid Buy-In programs provided varying amounts of
specificity about design issues. Laws in Iowa and Nebraska provide a general program
framework with few design details. Laws in Alaska, Connecticut, Minnesota, Vermont
and Wisconsin provide more detail on such design features as premium schedules,
asset rules, and income standards. In these states, the executive branch was charged
with operationalizing the design directives. In Maine and Oregon, the executive branch
through Medicaid State Plan amendments without specific state legislation initiated
Medicaid Buy-In programs. Subsequent legislative acts provided funding for the
programs.
In some states, prior to authorizing a Medicaid Buy-In program, the state
legislature mandated studies, surveys, or demonstration projects to gauge the need for
the program. In these states, Medicaid Buy-In programs and related employment
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initiatives were established subsequent to the completion of the studies and surveys. In
Connecticut, the Chair of the Human Services Committee in the House of
Representatives established the Work Incentives Working Group that was instrumental
in crafting the state's program. The Vermont legislature included language in an
appropriations bill requiring a study of potential methods to increase the number of
employed disabled individuals in the state. Subsequent legislation authorized the
Medicaid Buy-In program.
Similarly, the Wisconsin legislature, as part of an appropriations bill, created the
Pathways to Independence Demonstration Project. The Pathways Project, established
before the Medicaid Buy-In, was designed to provide coordinated vocational and health
care advice to disabled individuals and provided a test of several elements of the state's
system.

C. Management Structures
The Medicaid agency plays the lead role in most states on the development of
policy and program implementation. In general, states use existing Medicaid
management structures to administer the Medicaid Buy-In program. In some cases,
program design features mirror those of other Medicaid-related programs.
To address the multiple barriers facing persons with significant disabilities, many
states developed additional work incentives to complement the Medicaid Buy-In
program. Benefits counseling, expanded vocational rehabilitation services, and
collaboration with One-Stop centers established under the Workforce Investment Act
are among the incentives in place. Generally, the Medicaid agency has formal or
informal relationships with other state agencies, particularly vocational rehabilitation
programs and One-Stop service delivery systems.
In Alaska, the Medicaid Buy-In program is part of "Alaska Works." Alaska Works is
a cross-agency initiative spearheaded by the Governor's Council on Disabilities and
Special Education which is designing and implementing reforms focusing on the role of
One-Stop Centers, intake and referral procedures, and benefits counseling. The state
Medicaid agency has worked extensively with the vocational rehabilitation program,
One-Stop Centers and the State Workforce Investment Board.
In Connecticut, the Medicaid Buy-In program is integrated into a broader
Employment Plan that includes benefits counseling. The Rehabilitation Services Agency
is heavily involved in benefits counseling where advice about the Medicaid Buy-In
program is integrated into a broader Employment Plan developed for persons with
disabilities. The Department of Social Services (which includes both the Medicaid
agency and the agency administering the vocational rehabilitation program) conducts
outreach.
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In Iowa, the Department of Human Services (which includes the Medicaid
program) established a "charter group" to help draft the regulations implementing the
Medicaid Buy-In program, which included, among others, the vocational rehabilitation
program and Disability Determination Services. In Maine, the Medicaid Buy-In program
is running parallel to a Medicaid infrastructure enhancement project that is charged with
improving coordination of a range of policies and organizations. The Bureau of
Vocational Rehabilitation within the Department of Labor is a partner on the Medicaid
Buy-In as is the Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, and Substance
Abuse Services.
In Minnesota, the Department of Human Services assists county agencies in the
implementation of the program. One-Stop Centers established under the Workforce
Investment Act are involved in outreach and vocational rehabilitation training and
counseling. In Nebraska, as part of its Medicaid Infrastructure grant, the state is
seeking to integrate more effectively the operations and policies of the Medicaid Buy-In
program with other services to support working persons with disabilities.
In Oregon, the Department of Human Resources runs the Oregon Employment
Initiative, the state's comprehensive work incentive initiative, as well as the Medicaid
Buy-In program. Various divisions within the Department of Human Resources sit on the
Initiative Steering Committee. Employment Initiative Specialists work with employers
and provide, among other things, benefits counseling, peer mentoring, assistance in
writing PASS and Impairment-Related Work Expenses (IRWE) plans, interview
preparation, and self-advocacy skills for interacting with employers.
In Vermont, the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation has lead responsibility for
implementing the Vermont Work Incentives Initiative Project that includes benefits
counseling, job training, and case management. The Division works closely with the
Medicaid agency on the development of policy and implementation of the Medicaid BuyIn component. Vermont's Medicaid Buy-In program design is modeled after and uses
the same fees, premiums, collection efforts and sanctions as the state children's health
insurance program.
In Wisconsin, the Pathways to Independence program, the state's demonstration
project providing comprehensive programs integrating health care, vocational
rehabilitation, benefits counseling, and other services and supports, is run jointly by the
Department of Workforce Development and the Office of Strategic Finance of the
Department of Health and Family Services. The program is coordinated with the
Medicaid Buy-In program.
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III. MEDICAID BUY-IN PROGRAM
DESIGN FEATURES
Medicaid Buy-in program eligibility criteria, cost-sharing policies and other design
features vary among the states. In seven of the states, 250% of the FPL is the upper
income limit. Connecticut, adopted an upper level of 450% of FPL. Minnesota's
program has no upper income limit due to the state's decision to disregard all income
when determining program eligibility. While program eligibility is limited to persons with
disabilities with earnings, some states provide options that extend eligibility to
unemployed persons who will soon go to work or return from a work absence.

A. General Eligibility
Eight states require participants to be working to enroll in the Medicaid Buy-In
program. In Wisconsin, an unemployed individual participating in a Health and
Employment Counseling (HEC) program can be eligible for the Medicaid Buy-In.
Participants in HEC develop an employment plan and can participate in the in the BuyIn program for up to one year under their employment plan. Three states (Maine,
Minnesota and Vermont) have a six-month eligibility period. The other states
determine eligibility annually.
While states are constrained by federal law from directly requiring that Buy-In
participants work a minimum number of hours, several states specify certain workrelated requirements. Connecticut requires applicants to make contributions to FICA.
Oregon specifies that an individual must have taxable income to participate. Minnesota
requires income from work every 30 days to remain eligible for the Medicaid Buy-In
program.
Connecticut is the only state extending coverage to those who are "medically
improved." To qualify under the Medically Improved Group, a person must have been
previously eligible for the Medicaid Buy-In under basic coverage and must be
determined during a regularly scheduled medical review to no longer meet the
program’s disability requirements due to medical improvement. Persons qualifying as
medically improved must work at least 40 hours a month.

B. Income Eligibility
As permitted under federal law, each state established its own unique set of
income eligibility standards for their Medicaid Buy-In programs and developed related
policies on the use of individual or household income, additional income disregards, and
unearned income limits. As part of their eligibility standards, the states of Alaska,
Maine, Nebraska, and Vermont impose separate limits on the amounts of unearned
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income (e.g., SSDI) qualifying individuals can receive. These limits restrain enrollment
by limiting participation to persons whose unearned income falls below a set level. See
Table 1 for details on income eligibility.
TABLE 1. Income Eligibility Criteria
Whose Income is
Counted?
Alaska

Individual and
spouse for total
income.
Individual for
unearned income.

Connecticut

Individual.

Iowa

Individual and
spouse.
Individual and
spouse.

Maine

Minnesota

Individual.

Nebraska

Individual and
spouse.

Oregon

Individual.

Vermont

Individual and
spouse.

Wisconsin

Individual and
spouse.

What is the Countable
Income Eligibility Limit?
Two part test:
1. Family net income less
than 250% FPL.
2. Individual unearned
income less than APA
standard of need.
450% FPL
$6,250/mo (gross) or
$3,082/mo (net) after SSI
disregards.
250% FPL for family size.
Two part test:
1. Countable unearned
income less than 100%
FPL.
2. Earned and unearned
combined less than 250%
FPL.
No income limit.
Two part test:
1. 250% FPL for family size
using standard SSI
disregards.
2. Sum of all unearned and
spouse’s earned income
less than SSI benefit level
for family size.
250% FPL for individual.

Two part test:
1. Family net income less
than 250% FPL.
2. Family net income less
earnings and $500 of
SSDI at or below
medically needy protected
income level.
250% net family.

What Disregards Apply
in Determining
Countable Income?
Standard SSI disregards.

Is There a
Separate Unearned
Income Limit?
Yes. Unearned income
must be less than APA
standard of need.

Standard SSI disregards.

No.

Standard SSI disregards.

No.

Standard SSI disregards,
plus additional state
disregard on unearned or
earned income of $55.

Yes. Unearned income
limit is 100% FPL plus
$75.

1902(r)(2) All earned and
unearned income ignored.
Standard SSI disregards.
Individual’s earned income
disregarded in part 2 of
eligibility test.
Individual’s unearned
income if from Trial Work
Period.

No.

All unearned income,
standard SSI disregards,
and Employment and
Independence Expenses.
Standard SSI disregards.
Disregard all earnings and
$500 of SSDI for part 2 of
eligibility test.

Standard SSI disregards.

Yes. Unless an
individual is in a Trial
Work Period or
Extended Period of
Eligibility, SSDI income
(minus disregards)
must be less than SSI
income standard.
No.

Yes. Unearned income
limit is the medically
needy program’s
protected income level
plus $500.

No.

Upper Income Level
Seven of the states included in the Case Study established an upper income
eligibility limit at 250% of the FPL. Monthly income at 250% of poverty was
approximately $1,790 net income after applying standard SSI income disregards or
$3,665 gross income for a single individual ($43,980 annually) in 2001. Connecticut
has opened its program to any individual with gross income of less than $6,250/month
(equivalent to $75,000 annually) or net income of $3,082/month (approximately 450%
FPL). Minnesota has no upper income limit. It has instead used its authority under
Section 1902(r)(2) of the Social Security Act to disregard all income.
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Individual or Household Income
When determining eligibility, six states--Alaska, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska,
Vermont, and Wisconsin--count the income of both the medically eligible individual
and his or her spouse (if any), while three, Connecticut, Minnesota, and Oregon,
count only the income of the individual with a disability, regardless of household size.
Unearned Income Limits
In addition to total income criteria, the states of Alaska, Maine, Nebraska, and
Vermont have established separate limits on unearned income. In Alaska, applicants
must have individual unearned income less than the Alaska Public Assistance (APA)
benefit standard. Maine restricts eligibility to individuals with unearned income less than
100% FPL plus $75. In Nebraska, the sum of all unearned income and the spouse’s
earned income must be less than the SSI benefit level for the appropriate family size but
with an exemption from the limit if the individual has substantial earnings from a Trial
Work Period or Extended Period of Eligibility. The unearned income limit in Vermont is
the state's medically needy program's protected income level of $733 plus the $500
unearned income disregard.
Income Disregards
All states use standard SSI disregards to determine net income for purposes of
eligibility. 4 Five states exclude additional types of income in determining eligibility. As
noted earlier, Minnesota disregards all earned and unearned income in order to allow
working persons with disabilities of any income level to qualify for entry into the
program. In addition to the federal disregard of $20 per month, Maine has a separate
$55 per month state disregard of unearned income when counting unearned income.
Nebraska disregards the individual’s unearned income if it is gained during an SSDI
Trial Work Period or Extended Period of Eligibility. Oregon disregards all unearned
income in determining eligibility. Vermont disregards $500 of the applicant’s SSDI
income in determining whether the individual meets unearned income requirements.

C. Resource Limitations
With the exception of Alaska, the Case Study states allow substantially higher
levels of assets for Medicaid Buy-In program participants than are allowed for SSI
beneficiaries. Moreover, several states encourage additional savings by disregarding
assets held in retirement accounts, medical savings accounts, or other approved
accounts created to pay employment or independence-related expenses. Several states
provide considerable increases over previous levels, with Connecticut allowing
4

Standard SSI disregards include the first $20 of any monthly income and the first $65 of monthly earned income
plus one-half of the remaining earnings. IRWE and Blind Work Expenses are also disregarded when appropriate.
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resources of $10,000 for an individual and $15,000 for a couple, Wisconsin providing
for $15,000 for an individual (with no limit on spousal assets) and Minnesota setting a
standard of $20,000 (and also putting no limits on spousal assets). See Table 2 for a
complete list of asset standards.
Several states encourage specific kinds of saving by excluding additional amounts
of specified types of assets from the Medicaid Buy-In resource limit. Four states
(Connecticut, Iowa, Minnesota, and Oregon) specifically exclude retirement accounts
and medical savings accounts from the calculation of countable assets. Wisconsin
excludes retirement accounts initiated after enrolling in the Buy-In. In Vermont, all
assets purchased with earnings accumulated through work after January 1, 2000 are
exempt.
Five states created separate “approved accounts” for the purposes of paying
employment or independence-related expenses. Iowa disregards funds in an assistive
technology account in the calculation of assets. Wisconsin allows participants to
register retirement and other savings accounts as Independence Accounts; up to 50%
of earned income can be placed in an Independence Account. Oregon, Vermont and
Connecticut also offer some form of approved accounts.
TABLE 2. Resources Limits and Exclusions
What is the
Resource Limit?
Alaska
Connecticut
Iowa
Maine
Minnesota

Nebraska
Oregon

Vermont

Wisconsin

$2,000 Individual
$3,000 Couple
$10,000 Individual
$15,000 Couple
$12,000 Individual
$13,000 Couple
$8,000 Individual
$12,000 Couple
$20,000 (Only
count individual
assets)
$4,000 Individual
$6,000 Couple
$12,000 (Only
count individual
assets)
$2,000 Individual
$3,000 Couple
Plus assets
accumulated from
earnings since
1/1/00.
$15,000 (Only
count individual
assets)

Are Retirement Accounts
Excluded from
Countable Assets?
No.

Are Medical Savings
Accounts Excluded from
Countable Assets?
No.

Are Approved Accounts
for Employment or
Independence Excluded?
No.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

No.

No.

Yes, Assistive Technology
Accounts.
No.

Yes.

Yes.

No.

No.

No.

No.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes, if from earnings after
1/1/00.

Yes, if from earnings after
1/1/00.

Yes, if from earnings after
1/1/00.

Yes. Retirement accounts
initiated after Buy-In
enrollment are not
counted.
Retirement accounts
existing prior to Buy-In
enrollment are counted.

No.

Yes, Independence
Accounts.
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D. Cost-Sharing Policies
In every state, enrollees with incomes exceeding specified levels--ranging between
100% and 200% FPL--are assessed premiums. States differ as to whether they assess
premiums based on family income or individual income and on whether they use net or
gross income as the cost-sharing base. For purposes of cost-sharing, states may make
different decisions about income disregards and treatment of household income than
they made during the eligibility process. Their decisions reflect differing priorities about
relative ease of entry to the program and equitable allocation of program costs. Some
states have crafted their cost-sharing strategies to be similar to those in other Medicaid
programs such as waiver programs or SCHIP. The approaches require varying amounts
of administrative time and expertise.
Every state has established a minimum income level at which eligible persons
begin to share in program costs. The minimum level for payment of a premium ranges
from 100% FPL (Minnesota [after December 2001] and Alaska) to 200% FPL
(Connecticut and Nebraska). Iowa, Maine, and Wisconsin begin assessing premiums
at 150% FPL and Vermont at 185% FPL. In Oregon, individuals pay a premium if they
meet one of two conditions: either individual earned income is greater than 200% FPL
or unearned income exceeds the SSI income standard plus state supplement. Table 3
details the options states have chosen in setting premiums.
Design decisions made in the eligibility phase, such as counting household
income, income disregards, or the treatment of unearned income, may or may not be
used in determining cost-sharing. For example, Iowa and Wisconsin use family income
to determine eligibility, but individual income to determine premiums. Connecticut does
just the opposite, using individual income to determine eligibility and family income to
determine premiums.
Some states have special provisions designed to reduce premium liability.
Wisconsin collects a premium if individual gross income is above 150% FPL for the
enrollee’s family size. That is, an eligible individual with a spouse would have his
individual income applied against a two-person poverty level standard. Minnesota has
a similar approach, collecting a premium only if an individual’s income exceeds 100%
FPL for the appropriate family size. (Prior to December 1, 2001, premiums began at
200% FPL.)
Several programs reduce premiums if individuals are paying for private insurance
or Medicare. In Vermont, individuals in the 225-250% FPL bracket are eligible for a
discounted Medicaid Buy-In premium if they secure employer-sponsored coverage. In
Connecticut, premiums paid for private insurance reduce an individual's liability for
Buy-In premium payments. In Maine, a premium is due if net family income is above
150% FPL; however, there is no premium at any income level if the individual with a
disability is paying a Medicare Part B premium.
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Alaska, Connecticut, Maine, and Oregon deduct IRWE to determine countable
income for cost-sharing. Oregon also deducts “Employment and Independence
expenses” and Wisconsin has a special deduction for medical and remedial expenses.
Medicaid Buy-In programs in Connecticut, Iowa, Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin
have explicit links to employer-sponsored health insurance coverage. Those states
require Medicaid payment for employer-sponsored coverage for which individuals are
eligible if such coverage is less costly than Medicaid.
Setting Premiums
States use one of three methods to set premiums:
− A percentage of all income,
− A fixed amount based on income brackets, or
− Separate payments schedules for earned and unearned income.
Percentage of Income
Alaska, Connecticut and Minnesota calculate premiums as a percentage of total
income. Alaska charges a varying percentage based on income and family size up to a
maximum of 10%. Initially, Minnesota charged 10% of individual income above 200%
FPL for the family size. As of December 1, 2001, the premium is based on a sliding
scale between 1-7.5% beginning at 100% FPL. Connecticut calculates 10% of family
net income above 200% FPL, minus any income paid toward the cost of health
insurance.
Fixed Premium Based on Income Brackets
Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, and Vermont assess a fixed dollar premium that varies
according to income brackets. In Maine, for example, the premium is $10 per month if
monthly income is 150-200% FPL or $20 per month if monthly income is 200-250%
FPL. Nebraska uses a steeper premium schedule, with individuals paying $29 per
month at 200% FPL and $175 per month at 249% FPL. In Vermont, the monthly
premium, assessed only on persons whose incomes are at least 185% of poverty, is
$10 up to 225% of poverty and $25 between 225% and 250% of poverty but is reduced
to $12 if the individual secures employer-sponsored coverage. Iowa has eleven
payment brackets, ranging from $20 to $207 monthly.
Separate Payments for Earned and Unearned Income
Oregon and Wisconsin calculate separate payment obligations for earned and
unearned income with proportionately smaller premiums assessed on income derived
from work. In Oregon, unearned income in excess of the SSI income standard ($533) is
paid to the state. In addition, individuals pay a percentage of their earned income over
200% FPL but with disregards for work and disability-related expenses. For persons
liable for premiums, Wisconsin deducts the SSI income standard, IRWE, and medical
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and remedial expenses, and then collects the remainder of the unearned income as part
of the premium. The individual pays 3% of his earned income, in increments of $25, as
a premium.
TABLE 3. Cost-Sharing Policies: Minimum Income Level and Premium Method

Alaska

Income Level
at Which
Premiums Start
100% FPL net family
income.

Premium is a
“Percent of Income”
Yes. Varying percent by
income with 10%
maximum.
Yes. 10% of family income
minus any payments for
private health insurance.
No.

Connecticut

200% FPL net family
income.

Iowa

150% FPL gross
individual income.

Maine

150% FPL net family
income; no premium if
paying Medicare Part B.

No.

Minnesota

Gross individual income
of 100% FPL for family
size. (Before 12/1/01,
200% FPL for family
size.)
200% FPL net family
income.

Yes. Scale 1-7.5% of
income above 100% FPL.
(Before 12/1/01, 10% of
income above 200% FPL.)

Two part test:
1. Individual unearned
income above SSI
level.
2. Individual’s earned
income above 200%
FPL after work and
disability related
disregards.
185% FPL net family
income

No.

Gross individual income
below 150% FPL for
enrollee’s family size.

No.

Nebraska

Oregon

Vermont

Wisconsin

No.

No.

No.

Separate Premiums of
“Earned” and
“Unearned” Income
No.

No.

No.

Yes. Eleven brackets
with monthly range from
$20 to $207.
Yes.
150<200% FPL=$10
monthly.
200<250% FPL=$20
monthly.
No.

No.

Yes. Five income bands
with premiums from 2%
to 10%.
No.

No.

“Payment” based on
“Income Brackets”

Yes.
185-225% FPL=$10
225-250% FPL=$12 (if
have private insurance)
or $25 (if no private
insurance)
No.

No.

No.

Yes. All unearned
income in excess of SSI
income standard.
Between 2% and 10% of
individual’s adjusted
earned income and
remaining unearned
income.
No.

Yes. 100% of unearned
income minus standard
living allowance, work
expenses, and medical
and remedial expenses.
3% of individual earned
income.

E. Protections and Assurances
In some states, individuals who must leave the work force temporarily are able to
remain in the Medicaid Buy-In program temporarily. A few states allow individuals who
have acquired assets to retain them if they transfer to another Medicaid eligibility
category. See Table 4 for details.
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Continued Eligibility During Unemployment
In Connecticut, to protect persons who have temporary health problems or are
involuntarily terminated, an individual can continue to meet the employment test for a
period of up to one year from the date of employment loss. To do so, the individual must
profess an intention to return to employment. If employment ends for medical or other
reasons, the Iowa Buy-In program participant may remain eligible for up to six months
after the month of job loss if he or she intends to return to work.
Participants in Minnesota’s Medicaid Buy-In program are required to have income
from work every 30 days, but special allowances are made for those who switch jobs.
Also, as of December 1, 2001, recipients are allowed up to 4 months of medical leave-approved by a physician--without losing eligibility.
In Wisconsin, if a Medicaid Buy-In program participant has been in the program
for at least six months and has a health setback that makes him unable to work, the
work requirement may be exempted for up to 6 months. The individual may also
participate in the Health and Counseling program for up to a year. However, individuals
may only participate in the Health and Counseling program twice in a two-year period
with at least six months between each period of participation.
TABLE 4. Work-Related Policies and Protections
Work Requirements
Alaska
Connecticut

Must have earned income.
Must make FICA contributions.

Iowa

Must have earned income.

Maine
Minnesota

Must have earned income.
Some income from work every 30
days.

Nebraska
Oregon
Vermont
Wisconsin

Must have earned income.
Must have taxable income.
Must have earned income.
Must be working or enrolled in an
employment counseling program.
Can remain in employment
counseling for up to 1 year.

Protections for Temporary
Loss of Employment
None.
Can continue Buy-In for one year
after losing employment.

Yes. May remain eligible for 6
months after work stoppage.
None.
Previously, up to 2 months of medical
leave and allowances for switching
jobs. After 12/1/01, up to 4 months of
leave.
None.
None.
None.
Can enroll in HEC (time limited and
restricted to twice in 5-year period).
Can waive work requirement for 6
months due to a health setback.

Protections When Returning
to Other Eligibility Categories
None.
Assets in retirement, Medical
Savings Accounts, and
approved accounts not counted
during the individual’s lifetime.
None.
None.
As of 12/1/01, up to $20,000 in
assets protected for one year.

None.
None.
None.
None.

Exclusion of Assets
In Connecticut, an individual's assets in retirement, medical savings, and
designated accounts are excluded from consideration during his lifetime if he reapplies
for Medicaid under another eligibility category. As of December 1, 2001, Minnesota
allows up to $20,000 in assets to be protected for one year if a person moves from the
Medicaid Buy-In program to another Medicaid eligibility category.
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SSI Demonstrations
Several states secured authority from the SSA to operate demonstrations involving
specified SSI recipients participating in Medicaid Buy-In programs. Wisconsin received
approval to count as income $1 out of every $4 earned by specified SSI recipients
participating in Medicaid Buy-In programs (and the Pathways to Independence
Program), rather than the standard $1 for $2 calculation. The waiver also allows SSI
recipients to save up to 50% of their earnings in an approved account. Vermont has
also received approval to conduct a demonstration for specified SSI recipients
participating in Medicaid Buy-In programs.

F.

Design Changes

Minnesota made significant changes to its Medicaid program in 2001. The state
adopted a poverty level program and increased the protected income level for their
medically needy program to 80% of FPL. By allowing individuals additional Medicaid
eligibility options, these changes are likely to reduce enrollment in the Medicaid Buy-In
program. Several states are considering changes to their Medicaid Buy-In program.
Alaska is considering changes to resource levels and income disregards to encourage
additional enrollment, while Iowa is considering a provision limiting eligibility to those
disabled workers who pay FICA taxes.
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IV. COST ESTIMATES AND
BUDGET MODELING
When preparing budget estimates, states relied primarily on existing state
Medicaid data, especially eligibility and claims data for current and former Medicaid
clients, and SSA data on SSI and SSDI recipients. Some states used surveys and
studies from state vocational rehabilitation, state mental health or developmental
disabilities agencies. States often considered the data sources available to them
inadequate.
Each of the eight states providing budget assumptions (Oregon did not provide
assumptions) expected Medicaid Buy-In program enrollees generally would be existing
Medicaid beneficiaries and estimated some offsets in program costs from premium
payments. Connecticut and Wisconsin assumed cost offsets from converting
individuals in state-funded pharmacy or home care programs to Medicaid. Some states
estimated savings from private insurance coverage, while others did not attempt to
quantity private insurance dollars. Alaska's cost estimates assumed all individuals
enrolled in the Buy-In would leave public insurance coverage after a short period of
time.
Several states based their budget modeling on the enrollment and cost experience
of other states. For example, Minnesota based its cost estimate on Massachusetts'
experience implementing its Section 1115 waiver; Wisconsin based its cost estimate
on the experiences of Oregon and Massachusetts; and Connecticut based its cost
estimate on the experiences of states such as Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin.
In preparing fiscal estimates for their Medicaid Buy-In programs, analysts
developed models that estimated the number and characteristics of Buy-In Program
enrollees. Major variables influencing estimates were:
•

Number of persons expected to enroll.

•

Proportion of enrollees transferring from another Medicaid category.

•

Proportion of enrollees transferring from a state-funded program.

•

Amount of premium dollars.

•

Proportion of enrollees with private insurance coverage.

•

Length of time each person would remain enrolled.

Based on their analysis of the interactions among these variables, six of the nine
states predicted relatively modest budget increases relative to the size of their Medicaid
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program and two (Alaska and Wisconsin) predicted cost savings over time. As noted,
Oregon did not report budget estimates or assumptions.
Every state reporting information suggested that all or most potential enrollees
would consist of existing Medicaid enrollees. Analysts in Connecticut likely conveyed
the view of other Case Study states when they noted that "Medicaid is such an essential
service that almost every disabled person would have been willing to forego earnings
previously if that is what was necessary to meet the requirements for the Medicaid
program." These individuals were predicted to result in no new net costs to the state
because they were already on the Medicaid rolls.
Connecticut and Wisconsin adjusted their cost estimates to account for new
federal revenue to supplant state funds. Connecticut has a state-funded prescription
program (ConnPACE) and a state-funded personal assistance program. When
enrollees in those programs convert to Medicaid through Medicaid Buy-In program
participation, federal revenues become available for their personal assistance and
prescription drug costs. The state budget estimate included these new revenues. In
Wisconsin, analysts assumed some persons enrolled in the state-funded Community
Options program, a community-based long-term care program, would transfer to the
federally matched Medicaid Buy-In program.
Every state assumed some offsets from premium payments. Some states
assumed large savings from increased private insurance coverage. In Minnesota, for
example, the estimate assumed 16% of enrollees would gain employer-based coverage
with estimated annual savings to the state of at least $3,500 per person depending on
the individual's need for personal assistance services.
The states of Alaska and Wisconsin assumed cost savings over time as a result
of the Medicaid Buy-In program. The fiscal note in Alaska assumed net savings to the
state after the third year based on working individuals leaving the SSI state supplement
program and then leaving the Medicaid rolls for workplace coverage after a year of
continued Medicaid coverage. The Wisconsin estimate assumed net savings over time
as a result of a high level of premium payments combined with new federal funds for
previously state-funded programs.
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V. PROGRAM EXPERIENCE AND OUTCOMES
As of the end of 2001, approximately 13,000 persons were enrolled in the
Medicaid Buy-In program in the nine Case Study states. Consistent program data are
not available across the states. In most of the states, enrollment data thus far show
enrollment consistent with estimates. The percentage of persons previously enrolled in
Medicaid programs is generally consistent with estimates.
There is considerable variation in the percentage of enrollees paying premiums,
with as few as 11% in Maine to 58% in Alaska. Most states are finding that significant
numbers of persons on SSDI enrolled in the Medicaid Buy-In program (in the 86%
range) are earning below the SGA level ($740 monthly in 2001). In general, both
earnings levels and private insurance participation are lower than expected.

A. Data Sources
Medicaid Buy-In program data are often piecemeal and categorized by states as
preliminary. Some of the data may not be reliable because the experience base is too
short and the numbers are relatively small. Alaska, Oregon, Vermont, and Wisconsin
are among the states analyzing data from their comprehensive work incentive initiatives.
This analysis is ongoing and official findings have not yet been reported.
Several states are using their Medicaid Infrastructure grant funds to strengthen
data collection capacity, including the establishment of databases, the development of
research designs, and the hiring of experts. For example, Alaska, Maine, and
Nebraska are using their Medicaid Infrastructure grants to, among other things, develop
and implement a research plan focusing on program features such as eligibility,
enrollment, and costs. Connecticut is gathering data on enrollees through its Medicaid
information system and expects to publish utilization and cost data for the Medicaid
Buy-In program group after automated eligibility is instituted.

B. Program Experience
The categories used by states to report program experience and outcomes
include:
−
−
−
−
−

Age
Persons paying premiums
Persons with private health insurance
Persons previously enrolled in Medicaid, including SSI and SSDI recipients
Earned income amounts
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− Unearned income amounts
− Persons earning over the SGA Level.
Based on point-in-time reporting from all nine states, there were approximately
13,000 enrollees in the Medicaid Buy-In programs as of the end of 2001. (For
enrollment details for each state, see the individual case studies.) In most of the states,
data thus far show enrollment consistent with estimates. However, the states of Iowa
and Minnesota have enrolled substantially more persons than forecast, while
Nebraska has enrolled fewer persons than expected.
Previous Medicaid Enrollment
The percentage of persons previously enrolled in Medicaid programs was relatively
high and generally consistent with estimates. Examples of state reports are 88% in
Maine, 75% in Minnesota, and 90% in Vermont. States incur higher costs when an
individual transfers from the state's medically needy program with a spend-down to a
Medicaid Buy-In program without a spend-down. Alaska reported that persons enrolled
in the Medicaid Buy-In program incur lower monthly costs than they did when enrolled in
other Medicaid eligibility categories.
Private Health Insurance
Data available from Alaska and Minnesota show 12% of Medicaid Buy-In
program participants enrolled in private health insurance, a smaller number than
predicted.
Premium Payments
The proportion of persons paying premiums or other cost-sharing varied
significantly among the states. With six states reporting, the percentage of enrollees
paying premiums was 58% in Alaska, 40% in Oregon, 30% in Iowa, 17% in
Minnesota, 16% in Wisconsin, 15% in Connecticut, and 11% in Maine.
Earned Income
Significant numbers of persons on SSDI enrolled in the Medicaid Buy-In program
are earning below the SGA level. With the states of Connecticut, Minnesota,
Wisconsin, Iowa and Oregon reporting earnings data, approximately 14% of enrollees
had monthly earnings exceeding the SGA test for disability under the SSDI program
($740 in 2001). Nine percent of total enrollees had earnings over $1,000 a month.
Oregon reported that 51% of its Medicaid Buy-In program participants had
earnings over the SGA level. As described in the Oregon Case Study, Oregon requires
participants to pay as a cost-share any unearned income in excess of the state's SSI
standard. Thus, persons who choose the Medicaid Buy-In program in Oregon must
have sufficient earnings to compensate for the unearned income premium.
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Unearned Income
Connecticut, Iowa and Minnesota provided information on unearned income.
Monthly unearned income exceeded $600 in nearly two-thirds of the cases.
TABLE 5. Monthly Unearned Income of Medicaid Buy-In Enrollees

Reported by
Connecticut,
Minnesota and
Iowa

None

$1-$600

$600-$799

$800-$999

$1,000
& more

7.9%

26.5%

37.4%

18.7%

9.3%

Age
Wisconsin, Oregon and Minnesota provided information on the ages of
participants. In each of the three states, at least two-thirds of the Medicaid Buy-In
program enrollees were aged 40 or older. Based on these data, Medicaid Buy-In
program participants are substantially older than participants in SSI work incentive
programs. Two-thirds of Section 1619 recipients nationally are under the age of 40.
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VI. EFFECT OF THE MEDICAID BUY-IN ON
ACCESS TO COVERAGE
Based on their design decisions, three of the nine Case Study states--Iowa,
Connecticut, and Minnesota--have minimal restrictions on enrollment in their Medicaid
Buy-In program. These states do not distinguish between earned and unearned income
at the time of eligibility nor treat earned and unearned income differently when
assessing premiums.
Vermont, Alaska and Maine impose upper limits on unearned income for
qualifying persons, thus restraining enrollment of persons with significant income from
sources other than work. Oregon and Wisconsin use separate premium schedules for
earned and unearned income that assess higher premiums on unearned income than
on earned income. These provisions have the effect of encouraging participation from
persons with significant earnings from work and discouraging participation from those
with small amounts of work earnings.
Nebraska links the level of earnings to the amount of unearned income counted
towards eligibility. In order to disregard any of his unearned income, an individual in
Nebraska must have sufficient income from work to trigger a Trial Work Period (at least
$560 monthly as of January 2002). Without that level of earnings, individuals in
Nebraska must have unearned incomes at or below the SSI level to qualify for the
program.

A. Variation in Access to Medicaid
Demand for and enrollment in the Medicaid Buy-In program are likely to be
affected by how easily workers with disabilities can gain access to Medicaid through
other eligibility categories. Medicaid eligibility standards provide a different eligibility
baseline in each state. The effect of the variation in Medicaid eligibility standards is that
each state had a different "maximum income level" through which persons with
disabilities, including workers with disabilities, could gain access to Medicaid prior to the
Medicaid Buy-In program. The highest income standard in each state's Medicaid
program prior to the Medicaid Buy-In program is shown in Table 6. 5
5

Variation can occur in each of the following programs: (1) The income standard for the combined SSI and state
SSI supplement. This standard governs Medicaid eligibility determination for persons receiving cash benefits
through SSI and/or state SSI supplementation. (2) The "poverty level" or "standard of need" Medicaid
eligibility category. If a state chooses a poverty level option, this standard governs Medicaid eligibility for persons
who do not receive cash benefits from SSI and/or state SSI supplementation. (3) The amount of the protected
income level under the "medically needy" Medicaid eligibility category. In states without a poverty level
category, the protected income level determines how much money an individual not on SSI has to "spend-down"
before qualifying for Medicaid. In states with a poverty level category, it provides an alternative eligibility
mechanism for persons whose incomes exceed the poverty level standard.
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Alaska
Connecticut
Iowa
Maine
Minnesota
Nebraska
Oregon
Vermont
Wisconsin

TABLE 6. Medicaid “Starting Points”
Year 2001
Starting Point
Source
$984
Standard of need
$748
State SSI supplementation
$531
Federal SSI standard
$791
Poverty level with disregards
$716
Poverty level
$716
Poverty level
$533
State SSI supplementation
$733
Medically needy protected income level
$615
State SSI supplementation

In Connecticut, Maine, Alaska and Nebraska, the Case Study states with the
most expansive coverage, the highest Medicaid eligibility standard was at or above the
FPL. In these four states, individuals with disabilities could qualify for Medicaid if their
total incomes fell below a specified dollar figure. In Vermont, the highest Medicaid
standard was a medically needy protected income level that is above the FPL. After July
1, 2001, Minnesota established a poverty level Medicaid eligibility standard.
As shown on Table 6, the highest Medicaid eligibility standard in Wisconsin was a
state SSI supplementation level between the federal SSI standard and the FPL. Iowa
and Oregon, the two states with the least expansive coverage, had no Medicaid
eligibility standard above the federal SSI standard. In these two states, individuals with
disabilities who were not on SSI could qualify for Medicaid only if they "spent down" to a
level below the SSI level.
Thus, the new eligibility rules created by the Medicaid Buy-In program have a
greater or lesser effect on overall eligibility standards depending on the state's baseline
or "starting point." In a state with relatively generous Medicaid income standards in nonBuy-In categories, a greater proportion of working persons with disabilities can gain
access to Medicaid through avenues other than a Buy-In program. Alaska,
Connecticut, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Vermont have relatively generous
non-Buy-In eligibility standards for persons with disabilities, Wisconsin has less
generous standards, and Iowa and Oregon have the most restrictive standards.

B. Access to SSI Work Incentives
Medicaid Buy-In program enrollment may be influenced by the access of persons
with disabilities to existing SSI work incentives. The ease with which SSI beneficiaries
and persons receiving SSI state supplements can access Medicaid through SSI work
incentives is another factor where there is great variation among states. If gaining
access to continued Medicaid coverage is relatively easy for SSI beneficiaries who are
working, such persons are more likely to secure continued Medicaid coverage through
SSI work incentive provisions than if access is more difficult.
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As shown on Table 7, ease of access to Medicaid for SSI beneficiaries--and thus
access to continued coverage when beneficiaries goes to work--varies across the
states. Four of the states--Wisconsin, Vermont, Maine, and Iowa--provide automatic
Medicaid eligibility for federal SSI beneficiaries and thus automatic eligibility for
continued Medicaid for SSI workers under the provisions of Section 1619(b). Three
states--Alaska, Nebraska and Oregon--employ a more complex process by using
federal SSI criteria for Medicaid eligibility but requiring a separate Medicaid application.
The remaining two states--Connecticut and Minnesota--separate the two eligibility
processes even more by using state-specific criteria for Medicaid eligibility.
When federal SSI beneficiaries have earnings that affect their eligibility for cash
benefits, they automatically maintain Medicaid benefits in the states of Iowa, Maine,
Vermont, and Wisconsin. Federal SSI officials send the names of eligible persons to
the state and the beneficiary is not required to complete any additional forms. In the
remaining five states, state Medicaid agencies are responsible for using federal data to
secure continued eligibility for SSI beneficiaries who go to work. The administrative
processes involved are often challenging for states to carry out and for Medicaid
beneficiaries to understand.
Access to SSI work incentives for persons who receive a state SSI supplement but
no SSI cash benefits is often even more complex. Only one of the eight states with a
state SSI supplement--Vermont--has chosen federal administration of the benefit. In
Vermont, recipients of state SSI supplements receive the same Medicaid coverage
protection as SSI beneficiaries due to federal administration of the state SSI
supplement. In the other seven states with state SSI supplementation programs, SSI
recipients must apply for the state supplement and Medicaid at the state level. Of the
seven states, only Connecticut and Wisconsin grant continued Medicaid coverage to
state supplement-only recipients who lose their state SSI supplement due to earnings.
TABLE 7. Administration of Medicaid Eligibility Criteria and State SSI Supplementation
State

Alaska
Connecticut
Iowa
Maine
Minnesota
Nebraska
Oregon
Vermont
Wisconsin

Automatic
Medicaid for
Federal SSI
Recipient

Federal SSI Criteria,
but Separate Medicaid
Application Required

State Criteria for
Medicaid (209(b)
option) Separate
Medicaid Application
Required

Federally
Administered
State SSI
Supplement

X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

State
Administered
State SSI
Supplement

X
X

C. Federal Barriers Affecting State Initiatives
Minnesota, Vermont and Wisconsin have submitted to the SSA requests for
demonstration authority for specified SSDI recipients participating in the Medicaid BuyIn program. (Connecticut has authority under its state law to seek similar
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demonstration authority). In general, the demonstration authority would permit the
states to "stop the clock" for specified participants regarding the Trial Work Period and
the Extended Period of Eligibility, cessation month, grace months, and other related
timelines. Additionally, the states wish to disregard some earned income to prevent
precipitous declines in SSDI payments, such as reducing SSDI payments by $1 for
every $2 above the SGA level. These states perceive the failure of the SSA to grant
demonstration authority as adversely affecting their ability to enroll people in the
program and increase earnings of enrollees above SGA. Additional barriers include the
component of the definition of "disability" used for SSI and SSDI that includes the
inability of an individual to engage in work (Wisconsin and Nebraska).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and the TWWIIA authorized states to enact
Medicaid Buy-In programs for disabled workers. These laws provided state
policymakers and other stakeholders an opportunity to focus on issues associated with
employment of persons with significant disabilities. As these case studies in nine states
illustrate, the experiences of states that have implemented Medicaid Buy-In programs
and related employment initiatives provide a wealth of information for other states.
At the same time, a state should recognize the limitations of the experience of
other states. Every state starts from a different baseline as it relates to Medicaid
eligibility rules, the relationship between SSI eligibility and Medicaid, SSI state
supplementation, and the implementation of existing SSI work incentives. The purpose,
function, and size of a state's Medicaid Buy-In program vary depending on its policies
governing eligibility for cash benefits, work incentives, and health coverage through
Medicaid. Thus, the design of a Medicaid Buy-In program must be viewed in the context
of a state's overall Medicaid program, other state-specific initiatives, and fiscal
considerations.
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